The Game Theory of Terrorism

I have a post with references to actual papers on the subject over in the comments section of a related post by Frank McGahon. One thing I will say upfront - so that even those too lazy/busy to follow up will be aware of it - is that a certain amount of irrationality and a willingness to engage in excessive retaliation are perfectly valid tactics to adopt in dealing with the problem: in other words, it is eminently sensible to foster in one's opponents the impression that one is a hotheaded, "unilateralist warmonger."

This isn't a new insight by any means, or even a controversial one - Thomas Schelling laid it all out in his classic book The Strategy of Conflict way back in 1963 - and it's with this awareness in mind that I've always refused to take seriously criticisms of Bush on that score: had he proven to be more competent in his follow-up after the initial fighting in Iraq, and had his domestic programme looked more like something Reagan would have signed unto (i.e, spending cuts, and no catering to the religious right beyond lip service), I'd have had absolutely no problem endorsing him for a second term.

Unfortunately things are what they are, and I can only hope that Kerry's team realize that there is a legitimate place for brinkmanship and a tendency to overreact (or at least, a credible appearance of such) in the arsenal of tools available for dealing with international conflicts; the missile shield and the willingness to ponder "bunker-busting" nuclear bombs are part and parcel of projecting just such an image, even if all right-thinking people hope that neither project ever needs to see actual use.

PS: This set of lecture notes (pdf) from MIT's OpenCourseWare resource gives a nice, accessible treatment of all this, and it also makes another point that is sure to infuriate the "Bush is a moron" brigade: stupidity (or at least the appearance of stupidity) is also a strategic asset in conflict! The whole collection of lecture notes for the course can be found on this page, by the way.

Comments

[bbartlog]

Yes, and I imagine that Nixon adopted his so-called 'madman' strategy at least partly as a result of Schelling's book. It also makes sense from a game-theoretical perspective that an optimal strategy would involve a significant amount of randomness or unpredictability in response to an opponent. The difficulty here I think is that while these strategies are good for dealing with an enemy and even maintaining a peaceful standoff, they may make it much more difficult to actually make lasting peace (in the sense of 'converting an enemy to a friend'), due to the difficulties involved in establishing trust. Of course, if you believe that nations have only interests, not allies, then this might seem to be of no consequence...

[Abiola Lapite]

"Yes, and I imagine that Nixon adopted his so-called 'madman' strategy at least partly as a result of Schelling's book."

You're right about Nixon - he very consciously drew upon Schelling's ideas in dealing with the North Vietnmese, and it explains his tactic of escalating the intensity of US bombings into Cambodia even as he was conducting negotiations. He's even supposed to have put US forces on nuclear high alert before the Paris talks of 1969, with the intention of scaring the Soviets into thinking he was off the handle; unfortunately, it seems the Soviet monitoring system was so poor that they totally missed the signal (or perhaps they too had read Schelling's book and saw through Nixon's bluff).

Nixon was a brilliant guy, and he deserved far more of the credit for the foreign policy successes of his administration than the egomanical, self-promoting Kissinger will ever own up to. It's too bad he also happened to be crooked, vindictive sonofabitch ...

"Of course, if you believe that nations have only interests, not allies, then this might seem to be of no consequence..."

But wasn't it ever thus? How else to explain the actions of "allies" like France and Germany?

[Peder Jakobsen]

"You're right about Nixon - he very consciously drew upon Schelling's ideas in dealing with the North Vietnmese, and it explains his tactic of escalating the intensity of US bombings into Cambodia even as he was conducting negotiations. He's even supposed to have put US forces on nuclear high alert before the Paris talks of 1969, with the intention of scaring the Soviets into thinking he was off the handle"

Hi, I'm writing a paper on the history of applied game theory, but I'm having a hard time finding any good reference material. I would LOVE to find out where you (Abiola Lapite) obtained the information quoted above!